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Abstract
We study two standard multi-unit auction formats for allocating multiple units of a
single good to multi-demand bidders. The first one is the Discriminatory Auction, which
charges every winner his winning bids. The second is the Uniform Price Auction, which
determines a uniform price to be paid per unit. Variants of both formats find applications
ranging from the allocation of state bonds to investors, to online sales over the internet,
facilitated by popular online brokers.
For these formats, we consider two bidding interfaces: (i) standard bidding, which is
most prevalent in the scientific literature, and (ii) uniform bidding, which is more popular
in practice. In this work, we evaluate the economic inefficiency of both multi-unit auction
formats for both bidding interfaces, by means of upper and lower bounds on the Price
of Anarchy for pure Nash equilibria and mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria. Our developments
improve significantly upon bounds that have been obtained recently in [Markakis, Telelis,
ToCS 2014] and [Syrgkanis, Tardos, STOC 2013] for submodular valuation functions.
Moreover, we consider for the first time bidders with subadditive valuation functions for
these auction formats. Our results signify that these auctions are nearly efficient, which
provides further justification for their use in practice.
1 Introduction
We study standard multi-unit auction formats for allocating multiple units of a single good to
multi-demand bidders. Multi-unit auctions are one of the most widespread and popular tools
for selling identical units of a good with a single auction process. In practice, they have been
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ness, through his work on the project “DDCOD” (PE6-213). The project was implemented within the frame-
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by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) and the Greek State.
1
Valuation Functions
Auction Format
(bidding: standard | uniform)
Discriminatory Auction Uniform Price Auction
Submodular e
(e− 1)
3.1462
Subadditive 2
∣∣∣ 2e
(e− 1)
4
∣∣∣ 6.2924
Table 1: Upper bounds on the (Bayesian) economic inefficiency of multi-unit auctions.
in use for a long time, one of their most prominent applications being the auctions offered by
the U.S. and U.K. Treasuries for selling bonds to investors, see e.g., the U.S. treasury report
[33]. In more recent years, they are also implemented by various online brokers [9, 25]. In
the literature, multi-unit auctions have been a subject of study ever since the seminal work
of Vickrey [34] (although the need for such a market enabler was conceived even earlier, by
Friedman, in [14]) and the success of these formats has led to a resurgence of interest in
auction design.
There are three simple Standard Multi-Unit Auction formats that have prevailed and are
being implemented; these are the Discriminatory Auction, the Uniform Price Auction and the
Vickrey Multi-Unit Auction. All three formats share a common allocation rule and bidding
interface and have seen extensive study in auction theory [18, 23]. Each bidder under these
formats is asked to issue a sequence of non-increasing marginal bids, one for each additional
unit (i.e., a submodular curve). For an auction of k units, the k highest marginal bids win, and
each grants its issuing bidder a single unit. The formats differ in the way that payments are
determined for the winning bidders. The Discriminatory Auction prescribes that each bidder
pays the sum of his winning bids. The Uniform Price Auction charges the lowest winning or
highest losing marginal bid per allocated unit. The Vickrey auction charges according to an
instance of the Clarke payment rule (thus being a generalization of the well known single-item
Second-Price auction).
Except for the Vickrey auction, which is truthful and efficient, the other two formats suffer
from a demand reduction effect [1], whereby bidders may have incentives to understate their
value, so as to receive less units at a better price. This effect is amplified when bidders have
non-submodular valuation functions, since the bidding interface forces them to encode their
value within a submodular bid vector. Even worse, in many practical occasions bidders are
asked for a uniform bid per unit together with an upper bound on the number of desired units.
In such a setting, each bidder is required to “compress” his valuation function into a bid that
scales linearly with the number of units. The mentioned allocation and pricing rules apply
also in this uniform bidding setting, thus yielding different versions of Discriminatory and
Uniform Price Auctions. Despite the volume of research from the economics community [1,
24, 10, 3, 26, 4] and the widespread popularity of these auction formats, the first attempts
of quantifying their economic efficiency are only very recent [21, 31, 22]. There has also been
no study of these auction formats for non-submodular valuations, as noted by Milgrom [23].
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1.1 Contribution
We study the inefficiency of the Discriminatory Auction and Uniform Price Auction under the
standard and uniform bidding interfaces. Our main results are improved inefficiency bounds
for bidders with submodular valuation functions and new bounds for bidders with subadditive
valuation functions. To the best of our knowledge, for subadditive valuation functions our
bounds provide the first quantification of the inefficiency of these auction formats. The results
are summarized in Table 1. Our bounds indicate that these auctions are nearly efficient, which
paired with their simplicity provides further justification for their use in practice.
As a warmup, we begin by discussing pure Nash equilibria, in Section 4. In particular,
we investigate their properties and establish inefficiency bounds for both auction formats and
both bidding interfaces. An interesting consequence is that discriminatory pricing always
leads to efficient pure Nash equilibria.
Subsequently, we proceed to develop our main results, for the inefficiency of Bayes-Nash
equilibria, in Section 5. For submodular valuation functions, we derive upper bounds of
e
e−1 and 3.1462 <
2e
e−1 for the Discriminatory and the Uniform Price Auctions, respectively.
These improve upon the previously best known bounds of 2ee−1 [31] and 4 [22]. Regarding lower
bounds, for the Uniform Price Auction, we establish a lower bound of 2, which holds even for
pure Nash equilibria. We also prove a lower bound of ee−1 for the Discriminatory Auction, with
respect to the currently known proof techniques [31, 12, 6, 2, 16]. As a consequence, unless
the upper bound of ee−1 for the Discriminatory Auction is tight, its improvement requires the
development of novel tools.
We then move to subadditive valuation functions, where we obtain bounds of 2ee−1 and
6.2924 < 4ee−1 for Discriminatory and Uniform Price Auctions respectively, independently
of the bidding interface. These, we can improve by conditioning to the standard bidding
interface, to 2 and 4, respectively, by adapting a recent technique from [12]. In Section 6 we
discuss further applications of our results in connection with the smoothness framework of [31].
In particular, some of our bounds carry over to simultaneous and sequential compositions of
such auctions (see Table 2 in Section 6).
2 Related Work
A first quantification of the Uniform Price Auction’s inefficienct for bidders with submod-
ular valuation functions was presented in [22]. In particular, it was shown that, under the
standard bidding interface, this auction format admits pure Nash equilibria in undominated
strategies, with at most ee−1 times less welfare than the socially optimal allocation. This
bound was shown to be tight. For the inefficiency of (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria an upper
bound of 4 was developed. The first quantification of the Discriminatory Auction’s ineffi-
ciency for submodular bidders was developed by Syrgkanis and Tardos in [31]. The authors
presented several extensions of Roughgarden’s smoothness technique [27], which they used
for proving inefficiency upper bounds for several auction formats and compositions of them.
For the Discriminatory Auction with submodular bidders in particular they proved an upper
bound of 2ee−1 . More developments from [31] we discuss below. Recently, Christodoulou et al.
constructed in [7] a lower bounding example of 1.109 for the Price of Anarchy of mixed Nash
equilibria of the Discriminatory Auction, in the full information settting, when bidders have
submodular valuation functions.
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Let us note that, concerning bidders with subadditive valuation functions, there is no pre-
vious work on quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auction formats. Since the appearance
of the preliminary version of our work in [8], Christodoulou et al. showed in [7] a lower bound
of 2 for the Price of Anarchy of mixed Nash equilibria of the Discriminatory Auction for
bidders with subadditive valuation functions, which matches our upper bound of 2. Finally,
among the studies concerning the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions, we mention the exten-
sive and definitive treatment of the Generalized Second-Price Auction format by Caragiannis
et al. [5], wherein almost tight bounds are derived (in the full and incomplete information
settings) by means of smoothness techniques.
The multi-unit auction formats that we examine here present technical and conceptual
resemblance to the Simultaneous Auctions format that has received significant attention re-
cently [12, 6, 2, 16, 31, 7, 29]. However, upper bounds in this setting do not carry over to our
format. Simultaneous auctions were first studied by Christodoulou, Kovacs and Schapira [6].
The authors proposed that each of a collection of distinct goods, with one unit available for
each of them, is sold in a distinct Second Price Auction, simultaneously and independently
of the other goods. Bidders in this setting may have combinatorial valuation functions over
the subsets of goods, but they are forced to bid separately for each good. For bidders with
fractionally subadditive valuation functions, they proved a tight upper bound of 2 on the
mixed Bayesian Price of Anarchy of the Simultaneous Second Price Auction. Bhawalkar and
Roughgarden [2] extended the study of inefficiency for subadditive bidders and showed an
upper bound of O(logm) which was recently reduced to 4 by Feldman et al. [12]. For ar-
bitrary valuation functions, Fu, Kleinberg and Lavi [15] proved an upper bound of 2 on the
inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria, when they exist.
Hassidim et al. [16] studied Simultaneous First Price Auctions. They showed that pure
Nash equilibria in this format are always efficient, when they exist. They proved constant
upper bounds on the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria for (fractionally) subadditive val-
uation functions and O(logm) and O(m) for the inefficiency of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria
for subadditive and arbitrary valuation functions. Syrgkanis showed in [32] that this format
has Bayesian Price of Anarchy ee−1 for fractionally subadditive valuation functions. Feldman
et al. [12] proved an upper bound of 2 for subadditive ones.
Recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos [31] and Roughgarden [28] independently developed exten-
sions of the smoothness technique for games of incomplete information. In [31], these ideas are
further developed for analyzing the inefficiency of simultaneous and sequential compositions
of simple auction mechanisms. They demonstrate extensive applications of their techniques
on welfare analysis of standard multi-unit auction formats and their (simultaneous and se-
quential) compositions. For submodular valuation functions, they prove inefficiency upper
bounds of 2ee−1 and
4e
e−1 for the Discriminatory Auction and Uniform Price Auction, respec-
tively. Here, we improve upon these results; our improvements carry over to simultaneous
and sequential compositions as well.
3 Definitions and Preliminaries
We consider auctioning k units of a single good to a set [n] = {1, ..., n} of n bidders, indexed by
i = 1, . . . , n. Every bidder i ∈ [n] has a non-negative non-decreasing private valuation function
vi : ({0}∪ [k]) 7→ ℜ
+ over quantities of units, where vi(0) = 0. We denote by v = (v1, . . . , vn)
the valuation function profile of bidders. We consider in particular (symmetric) submodular
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and subadditive functions:
Definition 1. A valuation function f : ({0} ∪ [k]) 7→ ℜ+ is called:
• submodular iff for every x < y, f(x)− f(x− 1) ≥ f(y)− f(y − 1).
• subadditive iff for every x, y, f(x+ y) ≤ f(x) + f(y).
The class of submodular functions is strictly contained in the class of subadditive ones [20].
For any non-negative non-decreasing function f : ({0} ∪ [k]) 7→ ℜ+ and any integers x, y ∈
[k], x < y, the following are known to hold: If f is submodular, then f(x)/x ≥ f(y)/y. If f
is subadditive, then f(x)/x ≥ f(y)/(x+ y).
A valuation function vi can be specified by a vectormi = (mi(1), ...,mi(k)) of the marginal
values mi(j) = vi(j) − vi(j − 1) of bidder i, for each additional unit in his allocation (if vi is
submodular, mi(j) ≥ mi(j + 1)).
Standard Multi-Unit Auctions
The standard format, as described in auction theory [18, 23], prescribes that each bidder i ∈ [n]
submits a vector of k non-negative non-increasing marginal bids bi = (bi(1), . . . , bi(k)) with
bi(1) ≥ · · · ≥ bi(k). We will often refer to these simply as bids. In the uniform bidding format,
each bidder i submits only a single bid b¯i along with a quantity qi ≤ k, the interpretation
being that i is willing to pay at most b¯i per unit for up to qi units.
The allocation rule of standard multi-unit auctions grants the issuer of each of the k
highest (marginal) bids a distinct unit per winning bid. The pricing rule differentiates the
formats. Let xi(b) be the number of units won by bidder i under profile b = (b1, . . . ,bn).
We study the following two pricing rules:
(i) Discriminatory Pricing. Every bidder i pays for every unit a price equal to his corre-
sponding winning bid, i.e., the utility of i is: uvii (b) = vi (xi(b))−
∑xi(b)
j=1 bi(j).
(ii) Uniform Pricing. Every bidder i pays for every unit a price equal to the highest losing
bid p(b), i.e., the utility of i is: uvii (b) = vi (xi(b))− xi(b)p(b).
For a bidding profile b, the produced allocation x(b) = (x1(b), x2(b), . . . , xn(b)) has a social
welfare equal to the bidders’ total value: SW (v,b) =
∑n
i=1 vi(xi(b)). The (pure) Price of
Anarchy is the worst case ratio, over all pure Nash equilibrium profiles b, of the optimal social
welfare over SW (v,b).
Incomplete Information
Under the incomplete information model of Harsanyi, the valuation function vi of bidder i
is drawn from a finite set Vi according to a discrete probability distribution πi : Vi → [0, 1]
(independently of the other bidders); we will write vi ∼ πi. The actual drawn valuation
function of every bidder is private. A valuation profile v = (v1, . . . ,vn) ∈ V = ×i∈[n]Vi is
drawn from a publicly known distribution π : V → [0, 1], where π is the product distribution
of π1, . . . , πn, i.e., π(v) 7→
∏
i∈[n] πi(vi). Every bidder i knows his own valuation function but
does not know the valuation function vi′ drawn by any other bidder i
′ 6= i. Bidder i may
only use his knowledge of π to estimate v−i. Given the publicly known distribution π, the
(possibly mixed) strategy of every bidder is a function of his own valuation vi, denoted by
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Bi(vi). Bi maps a valuation function vi ∈ Vi to a distribution Bi(vi) = B
vi
i , over all possible
bid vectors for i. In this case we will write bi ∼ B
vi
i , for any particular bid vector bi drawn
from this distribution. We also use the notation B
v−i
−i , to refer to the vector of randomized
strategies of bidders other than i, under profile v−i.
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) is a strategy profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) such that for
every bidder i and for every valuation vi, Bi(vi) maximizes the utility of i in expectation,
over the distribution of the other bidders’ valuations w−i given vi and over the distribution
of i’s own and the other bidders’ strategies, B(vi,w−i), i.e., for every pure strategy ci of i:
E w−i|vi,
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
uvii (b)
]
≥ E w−i|vi,
b−i∼B
w−i
[
uvii (ci,b−i)
]
where Ev and Ew−i|vi denote the expectation over the distributions π and π(·|vi) (i.e., given
vi), respectively.
Fix a valuation profile v ∈ V and consider a (mixed) bidding configuration Bv under
v. The Social Welfare SW (v,Bv) under Bv when the valuations are v is defined as the
expectation over the bidding profiles chosen by the bidders from their randomized strategies,
i.e., SW (v,Bv) = Eb∼Bv [
∑
i vi(xi(b))]. The expected Social Welfare in Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium Bv is then Ev∼π[SW (v,B
v)]. The socially optimum assignment under valuation profile
v ∈ V will be denoted by xv. The expected optimum social welfare is then Ev[SW (v,x
v)].
Under these definitions, we will study the Bayesian Price of Anarchy, i.e., the worst case ra-
tio Ev[SW (v,x
v)]/Ev[SW (v,B
v)] over all possible product distributions π and Bayes-Nash
equilibria B for π.
Following the practice in previous related works, when analyzing the Uniform Price Auc-
tion we make the assumption of no-overbidding, i.e., that no bidder bids more than his value
for any number of units in any profile; formally, for every s ∈ [k],
∑
j∈[s] bi(j) ≤ vi(s). This as-
sumption is justified by the fact that overbidding strategies are generally weakly dominated,
in that they may cause violation of individual rationality. On the other hand, although
the Uniform Price Auction has individually rational equilibrium profiles wherein overbidding
occurs, these are generally unboundedly inefficient (much like in the well-known standard
example for the single-item Vickrey auction). In our analysis, we will use βj(b) to refer to
the j-th lowest winning bid under profile b; thus β1(b) ≤ · · · ≤ βk(b).
Remark 1.
(I) As in previous related work [6, 12], we can ensure existence of Bayes-Nash equilibria in
the auction formats that we study, if we assume that bidders have bounded and finite
strategy spaces, that emerge e.g. after some discretization. To this end, our bounds
on the auctions’ Bayesian Price of Anarchy concern essentially such sufficiently fine
discrete approximations, of our setting with continuous strategy spaces. For a relevant
detailed discussion we refer the reader to [12] (Appendix D).
(II) For both auction formats, the Discriminatory and the Uniform Price, we analyze equi-
librium profiles wherein no bidder outbids his value for the number of units he receives
in equilibrium; however, in a Discriminatory Auction, we do not need to restrict the bid-
ders’ strategy spaces with no-overbidding, because the auction does not have equilibria
wherein overbidding occurs (contrary to the Uniform Price Auction).
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4 Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section we discuss the properties of pure Nash equilibria of the two multi-unit auction
formats, under both the standard and uniform bidding interfaces. As we show, pure Nash
equilibria are always efficient under the Discriminatory Auction, unlike the Uniform Price
Auction.
4.1 Uniform Pricing
Pure Nash equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction have been analyzed recently in [21]. It is
well known that a socially optimum allocation can always be implemented as a pure Nash
equilibrium of this auction. Moreoever, by its loose association to the Vickrey Second-Price
Auction, the Uniform Price Auction retains certain properties in undominated strategies, for
bidders with submodular valuation functions. In particular, for any j ∈ [k] , it is always a
weakly dominated strategy for any bidder i to issue a marginal bid bi(j) > mi(j). Moreoever,
issuing bi(1) 6= vi(1) is also weakly dominated. Markakis and Telelis [21] showed that pure
Nash equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction in undominated strategies have inefficiency ee−1 .
In this paper we consider more general no-overbidding strategies, inclusively of the uniform
bidding ones. The following simple example shows that the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria
of the Uniform Price Auction in general no-overbidding strategies is slightly higher than the
bound of [21] (under the standard or uniform bidding interface):
Theorem 1. The Price of Anarchy is at least 2k−1k for the Uniform Price Auction with
submodular valuation functions.
Proof. Consider 2 bidders with submodular valuation functions, as follows:
v1(x) =
{
k, if x ≥ 1
0, otherwise
and v2(x) = x
The socially optimal allocation achieves welfare 2k − 1, by granting one unit to bidder 1 and
k − 1 units to bidder 2. For a pure Nash equilibrium consider a uniform bid 〈b1 = 1, k〉 of
bidder 1, claiming at most k units, and b2 = 0 for bidder 2. Clearly bidder 1 obtains maximum
utility, equal to k, in this configuration; for every additional unit that bidder 2 could obtain by
deviating appropriately, he would gain additional value equal to 1 and increase his payment
by exactly 1. Thus, bidder 2 also cannot improve his utility. The social welfare in this pure
Nash equilibrium configuration is k. This implies a Price of Anarchy that approaches 2 with
the growth of k.
For both bidding interfaces, upper bounds for the inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria will,
emerge from our results for the – more general – incomplete information model (Section 5),
in combination with the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For arbitrary valuation functions, every no-overbidding pure Nash equilibrium of
the auction with uniform bidding is also a pure Nash equilibrium of the auction under standard
bidding, subject to no-overbidding deviations.
Proof. Let b¯ be a no-overbidding pure Nash equilibrium of the Uniform Price Auction under
uniform bidding, for arbitrary valuation functions. We argue that it remains a pure Nash
equilibrium under the standard bidding. If any losing bidder i has incentive to deviate using
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a no-overbidding standard bid bi, so as to win at least one additional unit, he may do so
also by using a uniform bid 〈bi(1), 1〉, a contradiction. If a winning bidder has an incentive
to deviate under b¯ using a no-overbidding standard bid bi, having qi non-zero components
(marginal bids), then he may as well do so with a uniform bid 〈
∑
j≤qi
bi(j)/qi, qi〉; indeed,
because bi is submodular,
∑
j≤qi
bi(j)/qi ≥ bi(qi). Thus, the assumed uniform bid should
grant i at least as many units as bi.
The above Lemma, along with statement (ii) of Theorem 3 from Section 5, leads to the
following:
Corollary 1. The Price of Anarchy for pure Nash equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
with submodular bidders under the standard or the uniform bidding interface is at most 3.1462.
For wider valuation function classes than submodular, we do not know whether the Uni-
form Price Auction generally has pure Nash equilibria. To the best of our knowledge, and as
mentioned by Milgrom in [23], the standard multi-unit auction formats have not been studied
before, for any larger class of valuation functions. In Section 5 we give upper bounds of 4 and
6.2924 on the Price of Anarchy of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria for subadditive valuation func-
tions, under the standard and uniform bidding interfaces, respectively. By Lemma 1 however,
the former bound of 4 is valid also for uniform bidding, in the case of pure Nash equilibria.
Corollary 2. The Price of Anarchy of pure Nash equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction
with subadditive bidders under the standard or the uniform bidding interface is at most 4.
The upper bound of this corollary follows by the second statement of Lemma 1 and by
Theorem 4, discussed in Section 5. The lower bound is shown explicitly in Section 5.4.
4.2 Discriminatory Pricing
The Discriminatory Auction, as a generalization of the First-Price Auction, is not guaranteed
to possess pure Nash equilibria; their existence depends heavily on the choice of a tie-breaking
rule, as is often the case for games where players have a continuum of strategies. For example,
consider the first-price auction where the valuation of bidder 1 is 1, the valuation of bidder 2 is
ǫ < 1, and the tie-breaking rule always favors bidder 2. Obviously there can be no equilibrium
where bidder 2 bids above 1. Furthermore, if bidder 2 bids some value δ < 1, then bidder 1
does not have a best response in (δ, 1); no matter what he bids to win the unit, he always has
an incentive to lower his bid while still being above δ. Hence there is no Nash equilibrium
for this auction. We exhibit here that, as with first-price auctions, an appropriate choice
of a tie-breaking rule induces a uniform bidding profile that is a pure Nash equilibrium for
the auction, even subject to deviations under the standard bidding interface. Additionally,
we show that we can always obtain close approximations to pure Nash equilibria, i.e., pure
ǫ-equilibria, for every possible tie breaking rule.
Proposition 1.
(i) For every Discriminatory Auction there is a tie-breaking rule inducing a uniform bidding
profile that is a pure Nash equilibrium under that tie-breaking rule.
(ii) For every ǫ > 0, the Discriminatory Auction has a pure ǫ-equilibrium.
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Proof. (i) Let mˆ be the nk-dimensional vector obtained by appending all vectors mi, i ∈ [n],
and let m˜ be the vector obtained by non-increasingly ordering mˆ. We show that the set of
bid vectors b where every bidder sets all his marginal bids to m˜(k) is a pure equilibrium, if
ties are broken according to any tie-breaking rule that satisfies mi(xi(b)) ≥ m˜(k).
Assume without loss of generality that there are at least 2 players. Let b be the bidding
profile where all players bid m˜(k) on all items, and break ties in any way that satisfies that
mi(xi(b)) ≥ m˜(k). To see why this is a pure equilibrium, consider the player deviating to
bid vector b′i. Note that b
′
i − bi is non-increasing. Define ℓ as the lowest index such that
(bi − b
′
i)(ℓ) is negative (and define ℓ as k + 1 if there is no such index). In case ℓ ≤ xi(b),
then the utility of player i will certainly not increase by deviating to b′i, as he will lose utility
from the fact that xi(b) − ℓ less items are now allocated to him under (b
′
i,b−i), compared
to b. As player i used to derive non-negative utility from these items under b, this removal
of items accounts for a non-negative decrease in utility. Moreover, player i increases his bid
on his first ℓ items, so this accounts for a non-negative decrease in utility as well. His total
utility will therefore decrease in this case.
In case ℓ > xi(b), we are in a situation where player i increases his bids (under b
′
i,
compared to bi) on some of the first xi(b) items by at least 0, so he will win these items
under (b′i,b−i) but spend more money on it, leading to a decrease in utility. On any remaining
items that player i wins under (b′i,b−i), he overbids. This also accounts for a non-negative
decrease in utility. The total decrease in utility is thus non-negative in this case.
(ii) Let b∗ be a social welfare maximizing bidding profile. Consider the uniform bidding
profile b¯ as defined in Proposition 1 (i). Let (ξi)i∈N be a set of vectors that indicate the
optimal allocation (xi(b
∗))i∈N , i.e., ξi is the (0, 1)-vector of which the first xi(b
∗) entries are
1, and the remaining entries are 0. We show that b˜ = b+ ǫξ/k is a pure ǫ-equilibrium. The
reasoning we apply is largely analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 (i).
First of all, observe that there are no ties that need to be broken under b˜, and that the
allocation (xi(b˜) )i∈N satisfies mi(xi(b)) ≥ m˜(k).
Consider the player deviating to bid vector b′i. If player i wins less items under (b
′
i, b˜−i)
than under b, he will experience an increase in utility of at most (xi(b˜) − xi(b
′))ǫ/k due to
losing items, because the utility that player i derived under b′ from each of these lost items
was at least −ǫ/k. On the remaining items that player i still wins, the player increases his
bid by at least −ǫ/k, and this accounts for an increase in utility of at most xi(b
′)ǫ/k. The
total increase in utility is thus at most xi(b
′)ǫ/k ≤ ǫ.
If player i wins at least as much items under (b′i, b˜−i) than under b˜, the player will have
increased his bids on the first xi(b˜) items by at least −ǫ/k, and by at least 0 on the remaining
items. For these remaining items, the player experiences non-positive utility under (b′i,b−i),
whereas he experienced 0 utility under b˜. Therefore, the total increase in utility is in this
case at most xi(b˜)ǫ/k ≤ ǫ.
We show next that, whenever pure Nash equilibria exist, they are socially optimal, even
with arbitrary valuation functions. This is in analogy with other results on mechanisms with
first price rules [16].
Theorem 2. Pure Nash equilibria of the Discriminatory Auction (with the standard or the
uniform bidding interface) are always efficient, even for bidders with arbitrary valuation func-
tions.
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The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the following Lemma, which captures the main
properties of pure Nash equilibria. Notice that, the first in the Lemma below, essentially
states that every pure Nash equilibrium of the auction occurs at a uniform bidding profile.
Thus, the theorem is also valid for the uniform bidding interface.
Lemma 2. Let b be a pure Nash equilibrium in a given Discriminatory Auction where the
bidders have general valuation functions. Let d = max{bi(j) : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k], j > xi(b)}.
Then:
(i) For any bidder i who wins at least one item under b, and for all j ∈ [xi(b)]: bi(j) = d,
(ii) ℓd ≤
xi(b)∑
j=xi(b)−ℓ+1
mi(j), for all i ∈ [n] and ℓ ∈ [xi(b)],
(iii)
xi(b)+ℓ∑
j=xi(b)+1
mi(j) ≤ ℓd, for all i ∈ [n] and ℓ ∈ [k − xi(b)].
Proof. Let c be the smallest value in {bi(j) : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k], j ≤ xi(b)}, i.e., the smallest
winning marginal bid. Observe that c = d: Otherwise, a player i that bids bi(xi(b)) = c
could change bi(xi(b)) to a lower bid in order to obtain more utility. For the same reasons,
we conclude that any winning marginal bid bi(j) is equal to the largest marginal bid that is
smaller than bi(j). It follows inductively that all winning marginal bids are equal to d. This
establishes point (1) of the claim.
Suppose that for some i ∈ [n] and ℓ ∈ [xi(b)], it holds that:
ℓd =
xi(b)∑
j=xi(b)−ℓ+1
bi(j) >
xi(b)∑
j=xi(b)−ℓ+1
mi(j).
Then, if player i changes all marginal bids bi(j) for j ∈ {j : ℓ ≤ j} to 0, he would increase his
utility. This is not possible since b is a pure equilibrium, so we conclude that for all i ∈ [n]
and ℓ ∈ [xi(b)], it holds that:
xi(b)∑
j=xi(b)−ℓ+1
bi(j) ≤
xi(b)∑
j=xi(b)−ℓ+1
mi(j).
This establishes point (ii) of the claim.
Assume that there is i ∈ [n] and ℓ ∈ [k − xi(b)] such that:
xi(b)+ℓ∑
j=xi(b)+1
mi(j) > ℓd.
Then, if player i would change his marginal bids bi(j), j ∈ {j : 1 ≤ j ≤ xi(b) + ℓ} to d+ ǫ for
some ǫ > 0, then player i’s utility increases by:
xi(b)+ℓ∑
j=xi(b)+1
mi(j)− ℓ(d+ ǫ)− xi(b)ǫ.
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Because
∑xi(b)+ℓ
j=xi(b)+1
mi(j)− ℓd is positive, this total increase is positive when we take for ǫ a
sufficiently small value. This is in contradiction with the fact that b is a pure equilibrium,
and this establishes point (iii) of the claim.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let b∗ be a bid vector that attains the optimum social welfare. Denote
by A the set of bidders that get more items under b than under b∗. For a bidder i ∈ A,
define ℓi as the number of extra items that i gets under b, when compared to b
∗; i.e.,
ℓi = xi(b)−xi(b
∗). Denote by B the set of bidders that get more items under b∗ than under
b. For a bidder i ∈ B, define ℓi as the number of extra items that i gets under b
∗, when
compared to b; i.e., ℓi = xi(b
∗)− xi(b). Then,
n∑
i=1
vi(xi(b)) −
n∑
i=1
vi(xi(b
∗)) =
n∑
i=1

xi(b)∑
j=1
mi(j)−
xi(b∗)∑
j=1
mi(j)


=
∑
i∈A
xi(b)∑
j=xi(b)−ℓi+1
mi(j) −
∑
i∈B
xi(b)+ℓi∑
j=xi(b)+1
mi(j) ≥
∑
i∈A
ℓid−
∑
i∈B
ℓid = 0.
The inequality in the derivation above follows from points (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 2, and
the final equality holds because
∑
i∈A ℓi =
∑
i∈B ℓi. Thus, the social welfare of the pure
equilibrium b is optimal. ✷
5 Bayes-Nash Inefficiency
In this section we develop our main results, concerning the inefficiency of (mixed) Bayes-Nash
equilibria. We derive bounds on the (mixed) Bayesian Price of Anarchy for the Discriminatory
and the Uniform Price Auctions with submodular and subadditive valuation functions. For
the latter class of valuation functions our bounds are the first results to appear in the literature
of standard multi-unit auctions (see also the commentary in [23, Chapter 7]).
Theorem 3. The Bayesian Price of Anarchy (under the standard or uniform bidding format)
is at most
(i) ee−1 and
2e
e−1 for the Discriminatory Auction with submodular and subadditive valuation
functions, respectively,
(ii) |W−1(−1/e
2)| ≈ 3.1462 < 2ee−1 and 2|W−1(−1/e
2)| ≈ 6.2924 < 4ee−1 for the Uniform
Price Auction with submodular and subadditive valuation functions, respectively, W−1
being the lower branch of the Lambert W function.
This theorem improves on the currently best known upper bounds of 2ee−1 and
4e
e−1 for
the Discriminatory Auction and the Uniform Price Auction, respectively, with submodular
valuation functions due to Syrgkanis and Tardos [31]. For the Uniform Price Auction, this
further reduces the gap from the known lower bound of ee−1 [21]. Syrgkanis and Tardos [31]
obtained their bounds through an adaptation of the smoothness framework for games with
incomplete information ([28, 32]). The bounds of Theorem 3 and some additional results can
also be obtained through this framework. We comment on this in more detail in Section 6.
For subadditive valuation functions and the standard bidding format, however, better
bounds can be obtained by adapting a technique recently introduced by Feldman et al. [12],
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which does not fall within the smoothness framework. We were unable to derive these bounds
via a smoothness argument and believe that this is due to the additional flexibility provided
by this technique.
Theorem 4. The Bayesian Price of Anarchy is at most 2 and 4 for the Discriminatory
Auction and the Uniform Price Auction, respectively, with subadditive valuation functions
under the standard bidding format.
5.1 Proof Template for Bayesian Price of Anarchy
In order to present all our bounds from Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 in a self-contained and
unified manner, we make use of a proof template which is formalized in Theorem 5 below.
Variants of this approach have been used in several previous works (e.g., [21, 6, 2]).
Theorem 5. Let V be a class of valuation functions. Suppose that for every valuation profile
v ∈ V n, for every bidder i ∈ [n], and for every distribution P−i over non-overbidding profiles
b−i, there is a bidding profile b
′
i such that the following inequality holds for some λ > 0 and
µ ≥ 0:
Eb−i∼P−i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥ λ · vi(x
v
i )− µ · Eb−i∼P−i
[ xvi∑
j=1
βj(b−i)
]
. (1)
Then, the Bayesian Price of Anarchy is at most
(i) max{1, µ}/λ for the Discriminatory Auction,
(ii) (µ + 1)/λ for the Uniform Price Auction.
Note that in this theorem we make no assumptions regarding the bidding interface; proving
a bound for the uniform bidding interface only requires that we exhibit a uniform bidding
strategy b′i for each bidder i and for any distribution P−i of uniform non-overbidding profiles
b−i. The Theorem’s proof follows.
Proof. For any particular bidder i ∈ [n] let U i ⊆ V denote the subset of valuation profiles
v ∈ V where xv(i) ≥ 1, i.e., U i = {v ∈ V|xv(i) ≥ 1}; these are the profiles under which i is a
“socially optimum winner”. Accordingly, we let Wv denote the subset of “socially optimum
winners” in valuation profile v ∈ V.
Consider a Bayes-Nash equilibrium B. Fix any valuation profile v = (vi,v−i) ∈ V and a
bidder i ∈ [n]. Assume that bidder i deviates according to a bidding vector b′i satisfying (1),
taking P−i = B
w−i
−i ,w−i ∼ π−i. By taking expectation over all valuation profiles w−i ∈ V−i,
we obtain
E
w−i|vi
[
E
b−i∼B
w−i
−i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]]
≥ λvi(x
v
i )− µ · E
w−i|vi

 E
b−i∼B
w−i
−i

 xvi∑
j=1
βj(b−i)




≥ λvi(x
v
i )− µ · E
w

 E
b∼Bw

 xvi∑
j=1
βj(b)



 ,
where the last inequality holds because βj(b−i) ≤ βj(b) for every j = 1, . . . , k and by the
independence of πi, i.e.,
∑
w−i
π(w−i|vi) = 1 =
∑
w
π(w). Because B is a Bayes-Nash
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equilibrium, bidder i does not have an incentive to deviate and, thus:
Ew−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
uvii (b)
]]
≥ Ew−i|vi
[
E
b−i∼B
w−i
−i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]]
.
We conclude that
Ew−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
uvii (b)
]]
+ µEw

Eb∼Bw

 xvi∑
j=1
βj(b)



 ≥ λvi(xvi ).
Taking expectation of both sides over the distribution of v ∈ U i and summing over all
bidders we obtain
∑
i∈[n]
∑
v∈U i
π(v) ·

 E
w−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
uvii (b)
]]
+ µE
w

 E
b∼Bw

 xvi∑
j=1
βj(b)






≥
∑
i∈[n]
∑
v∈U i
π(v) · λvi(x
v
i ) =
∑
v
π(v)
∑
i∈Wv
λvi(x
v
i ) = λEv
[
SW (v,xv)
]
.
By standard manipulations, the latter simplifies to
E
v

 E
b∼Bv

∑
i∈[n]
uvii (b)



+ µE
w

 E
b∼Bw

∑
i∈[n]
xvi∑
j=1
βj(b)



 ≥ λE
v
[
SW (v,xv)
]
.
Note that
∑
i∈[n] x
v
i = k and that βj(b) is non-decreasing in j. We can therefore bound
∑
i∈[n]
xvi∑
j=1
βj(b) ≤
k∑
j=1
βj(b)
and obtain
E
v

 E
b∼Bv

∑
i∈[n]
uvii (b)



+ µE
w

 E
b∼Bw

 k∑
j=1
βj(b)



 ≥ λE
v
[
SW (v,xv)
]
. (2)
Note that for the discriminatory pricing rule the total payments under b are equal to∑k
j=1 βj(b). Thus (2) yields
E
v
[
E
b∼Bv
[
SW (v,b)
]]
+ (µ− 1)E
w

 E
b∼Bw

 k∑
j=1
βj(b)



 ≥ λE
v
[
SW (v,xv)
]
.
If µ ≤ 1, the first statement of the theorem holds. If µ > 1, then we exploit that the total
payments satisfy
∑k
j=1 βj(b) ≤
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi(b)) = SW (v,b) because players never overbid.
1
Dividing both sides by µ > 0 proves the first statement of the theorem in this case.
1In order to derive the claimed bound for the case µ > 1 we need to exploit the no-overbidding assumption
mentioned in Section 3 for the Discriminatory Auction as well. However, all our bounds derived in this paper
exploit only that µ ≤ 1 and thus hold even without this assumption.
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For the uniform price rule we use that
∑k
j=1 βj(b) ≤
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi(b)) = SW (v,b) becau-
se of the no-overbidding assumption and that
∑
i∈[n] u
vi
i (b) ≤
∑
i∈[n] vi(xi(b)) = SW (v,b).
Thus, (2) yields
(µ+ 1)Ev [Eb∼Bv [SW (v,b)]] ≥ λEv[SW (v,x
v)].
Dividing both sides by µ+ 1 > 0 proves the second statement of the theorem.
In Section 5.4 we show that our bound of ee−1 for the Discriminatory Auction is essentially
best possible, if one sticks to the proof template of Theorem 5; this also rules out that better
bounds can be obtained via the techniques described in [31] or even [12]; the latter we use in
subsection 5.3.
5.2 Key Lemma and Proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4
The following is our key lemma to prove Theorem 3. We point out that it applies to arbitrary
valuation functions and to any multi-unit auction which is discriminatory price dominated,
i.e., the total payment Pi(b) of bidder i under profile b satisfies Pi(b) ≤
∑
j∈[xi(b)]
bi(j). Note
that every multi-unit auction guaranteeing individual rationality must satisfy this condition.
Lemma 3 (Key Lemma). Let v be a valuation profile and suppose that the pricing rule is
discriminatory price dominated. Define τi = argminj∈[xvi ] vi(j)/j for every i ∈ [n]. Then for
every bidder i ∈ [n] and every bidding profile b−i there exists a randomized uniform bidding
strategy B′i, such that for every α > 0
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥ α
(
1−
1
e1/α
)
xvi
vi(τi)
τi
− α
xvi∑
j=1
βj(b−i). (3)
Proof. Define G = (1− e−1/α) and let ci be the vector that is vi(τi)/τi on the first x
v
i entries,
and is 0 everywhere else. Let t be a random variable drawn from [0, G] with probability
density function f(t) = α/(1− t). Define the random deviation of bidder i as b′i = tci. Note
that b′i is always a uniform bid vector.
Let k∗ be the number of items that bidder i would win under profile (Gci,b−i), i.e., the
number of items won by i, when i would deviate to bid vector Gci. For j = 0, . . . , k
∗, let γj
refer to the infimum value in [0, G] such that bidder i would win j items if he would deviate
to bid vector γjci. Note that this definition is equivalent to defining γj as the least value in
[0, G] that satisfies γjvi(τi)/τi = βj(b−i). For notational convenience, we define γk∗+1 = G.
Let xi(b
′
i,b−i) be the random variable that denotes the number of units allocated to
bidder i under (b′i,b−i). It always holds that xi(b
′
i,b−i) ≤ k
∗ ≤ xvi , because bidder i bids
b′i(j) = 0 for all j = x
v
i + 1, . . . , k. More precisely, we have xi(b
′
i,b−i) = j if t ∈ (γj , γj+1]
for j = 0, . . . , k∗. By assumption, the payment of bidder i under profile (b′i,b−i) is at most
txi(b
′
i,b−i)vi(τi)/τi. Also note that, by definition of τi, it holds that vi(j) ≥ jvi(τi)/τi for
j ≤ xvi . Using these two facts, we can bound the expected utility of bidder i as follows:
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥
k∗∑
j=1
∫ γj+1
γj
(
vi(j) − tj
vi(τi)
τi
)
f(t)dt
≥
k∗∑
j=1
∫ γj+1
γj
j
vi(τi)
τi
(1− t)f(t)dt = α
k∗∑
j=1
j
vi(τi)
τi
∫ γj+1
γj
1dt
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= α
k∗∑
j=1
j
vi(τi)
τi
(γj+1 − γj) = αGk
∗ vi(τi)
τi
− α
k∗∑
j=1
γj
vi(τi)
τi
= αGk∗
vi(τi)
τi
− α
k∗∑
j=1
βj(b−i) ≥ αGx
v
i
vi(τi)
τi
− α
xvi∑
j=1
βj(b−i).
The last inequality holds because Gvi(τi)/τi ≤ βj(b−i), for k
∗+1 ≤ j ≤ xvi , by the definition
of k∗. The above derivation implies (3).
The deviation B′i, defined in Lemma 3, is a distribution on pure uniform bidding strategies
b′i. Because the lemma holds for every (pure) bidding profile b−i of bidders other than i, we
can take expectation of both sides of (3), over any distribution P−i of such profiles b−i. Then,
we obtain a version of the inequality, (1), required by Theorem 5, with expected values on
both sides, over the distribution B′i. This means that B
′
i contains at least one pure strategy
b′i in its support, satisfying exactly (1), for (λ, µ) = (α
(
1− e−1/α
)
, α).
Moreoever, because B′i yields pure uniform bidding strategies, the lemma applies to both
the standard and the uniform bidding interfaces. Observe also that every b′i ∼ B
′
i satisfies
the no-overbidding assumption.
Proof of of Theorem 3. First consider the case of submodular valuation functions. In this
case, τi = x
v
i for every i ∈ [n], as explained in Section 3. Using our Key Lemma, we conclude
that Theorem 5 holds for (λ, µ) = (α
(
1− e−1/α
)
, α). The stated bounds are obtained by
choosing α = 1 for the Discriminatory Auction and α = −1/(W−1(−1/e
2)+ 2) ≈ 0.87 for the
Uniform Price Auction.
Next consider the case of subadditive valuation functions. The following lemma shows
that subadditive valuation functions can be approximated by uniform ones, thereby losing at
most a factor 2.
Lemma 4. If vi is subadditive, then
vi(τi)
τi
≥ 12
vi(xvi )
xvi
with τi = argminj∈[xvi ]
vi(j)
j .
By combining Lemma 4 with our Key Lemma, it follows that Theorem 5 holds for (λ, µ) =
(α2
(
1− e−1/α
)
, α). The bounds stated in Theorem 3 are obtained by the same choices of α
as for the submodular valuation functions. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that τi = argminj∈[xvi ] vi(j)/j. Thus, it suffices to show that
vi(τi)/τi ≥ vi(x
v
i )/(2x
v
i ). By subadditivity, vi(x
v
i )/(2x
v
i ) is at most:
1
2
(
vi(x
v
i − τi)
xvi
+
vi(τi)
xvi
)
≤


1
2
(
vi(x
v
i −τi)
τi
+ vi(τi)τi
)
≤ vi(τi)τi if x
v
i ≤ 2τi
1
2
(
vi(xvi −τi)
xvi
+ vi(τi)τi
)
≤ vi(τi)τi if x
v
i > 2τi
where in the first case we used monotonicity, i.e., vi(x
v
i − τi) ≤ vi(τi) and in the second case
we used subadditivity, i.e., vi(τi)τi ≥
vi(x
v
i −τi)
xvi −τi+τi
=
vi(x
v
i −τi)
xvi
. ✷
5.3 Subadditive Valuation Functions
Next, consider subadditive valuations under the standard bidding format. We derive improved
bounds of 2 and 4 for the Discriminatory and Uniform Price Auction, respectively. To this
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end, we adapt an approach recently developed by Feldman et al. [12] to establish an analog
of our Key Lemma. The main idea is to construct the bid b′i by using the distribution P−i
on the profiles b−i. Theorem 4 then follows from Theorem 5 in combination with Lemma 5
below.
Lemma 5. Let V be the class of subadditive valuation functions. Then Theorem 3 holds true
with (λ, µ) = (12 , 1) for the Discriminatory and (λ, µ) = (
1
2 , 1) for the Uniform Price Auction
(under the standard bidding format).
Discriminatory Pricing
We consider first the discriminatory pricing rule. We shall re-use certain arguments from the
proof for this case, in the proof for uniform pricing. Fix any bidder i and let bi be a bidding
vector, conforming to the requirement of non-increasing marginal bids and having only its
first x components equal to a non-zero value. Given any bidding profile b−i:
uvii (bi,b−i) ≥ vi
(
xi(bi,b−i)
)
−
∑
j≤x
bi(j),
because i may pay at most
∑
j≤k bi(j) =
∑
j≤x bi(j), by the definition of bi and the auction’s
payment rule. Taking expectation over the distribution P of b−i we have:
Eb−i∼P
[
uvii (bi,b−i)
]
≥ Eb−i∼P
[
vi
(
xi(bi,b−i)
)]
−
∑
j≤x
bi(j) (4)
From this point on, we analyze the right-hand side of (4). Given the distribution P of b−i,
let D denote the distribution of the k highest bids in b−i, β1(b−i) ≤ · · · ≤ βk(b−i); to simplify
notation, in the sequel we use simply βj , j = 1, . . . , k, without a reference to b−i. For every
fixed bid vector of bidder i, the expected utility of i when the other bidders bid according to P,
is equal to the expected utility of bidder i in the two-bidders auction, where the other bidder
bids according to D. We can thus assume that i competes only against β ∼ D, containing
βj , j = 1, . . . , k. For notational purposes below, we shall also use γ to denote a vector drawn
from D. Notice that each β ∼ D contains βj, j = 1, . . . , k in non-increasing order, as required
by the auction format; however, for our analysis, we find it convenient to index the individual
bids, βj , in non-decreasing order.
We consider what happens when i responds to P (i.e., D, in the two-bidders auction), by
bidding a bi = β˜, that he constructs as follows: he samples a vector β from D and zeroes-out
the k − x highest values in β. Subsequently, he adds to all components of the “truncated”
vector a sufficiently small ǫ. This latter modification we shall omit in our analysis below,
to simplify its exposition. It serves the purpose of avoiding ties with the opposing bids; the
analysis is valid when this ǫ becomes vanishingly small. Let D˜ denote the distribution of such
bi. Continuing from (4), the expected utility of i over bi ∼ D˜ is:
E
bi∼D˜
[
E
b−i∼P
[
uvii (bi,b−i)
]]
≥ E
bi∼D˜
[
E
b−i∼P
[
vi
(
xi(bi,b−i)
)]
−
∑
j≤x
bi(j)
]
= E
β∼D
b−i∼P
[
vi
(
xi(β˜,b−i)
)
−
∑
j≤x
βj
]
= E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)]
− E
β∼D
γ∼D
[∑
j≤x
βj
]
(5)
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=
1
2
· 2 · E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)]
− E
β∼D

∑
j≤x
βj


=
1
2

 Eβ∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)
+ vi
(
xi(γ˜, β)
)]
− Eβ∼D

∑
j≤x
βj


≥
1
2
Eβ∼D
γ∼D
[
vi(x)
]
− Eβ∼D

∑
j≤x
βj

 = 1
2
vi(x)− Eb−i∼P

 x∑
j=1
βj(b−i)

 (6)
where (5) is due to the fact that
∑
j≤x bi(j) =
∑
j≤x β˜j =
∑
j≤x βj , by construction of β˜ and
because bi has its components (taken from β˜) in non-increasing order. The last inequality,
in (6), holds by subadditivity of vi, particularly, because xi(β, γ) + xi(γ, β) ≥ x (when ties
are always resolved in favor of i). From the derivation above we deduce that there is at least
one pure bidding strategy bi ∼ D¯ that satisfies the requirements of Theorem 5 and (1), with
(λ, µ) =
(
1
2 , 1
)
.
Uniform Pricing
Fix any bidder i and let bi be a bidding vector with non-zero value for each of the first x
components and zero value for the rest. Notice that, given any bidding profile b−i:
uvii (bi,b−i) = vi
(
xi(bi,b−i)
)
− xi(bi,b−i) · p(bi,b−i)
≥ vi
(
xi(bi,b−i)
)
−
∑
j≤x
bi(j)
where p(bi,b−i) is the uniform price that i will pay under the profile (bi,b−i). This price
cannot be more than the sum of the winning bids,
∑
j≤x bi(j); this justifies the inequality
above. Taking expectation over the distribution P of b−i we have:
Eb−i∼P
[
uvii (bi,b−i)
]
≥ Eb−i∼P
[
vi
(
xi(bi,b−i)
)]
−
∑
j≤x
bi(j) (7)
Our analysis from this point on will focus on identifying an appropriate bid bi for bidder
i, that satisfies also no-overbidding. Subsequently, we shall return to process (7) further. As
previously, given the distribution P of b−i, we define the distribution D of the k highest bids
in b−i, β1(b−i) ≤ · · · ≤ βk(b−i); we use simply βj , j = 1, . . . , k, without a reference to b−i.
Each of these is a potential uniform price that i might need to pay, depending on his own bids,
bi. Moreover, we can assume that i competes against a bid vector β, containing only the bids
βj , j = 1, . . . , k, and need not bother with any smaller bids. Fix any such vector β from the
support of D and let Tβ ⊆ [x] be a maximal subset of indices, such that:
∑
j∈Tβ
βj > vi(|Tβ |).
Let T¯β = [x] \ Tβ. Then, we claim that:
∑
j∈T¯β
βj ≤ vi(|T¯β |). Indeed, if there exists R ⊆ T¯β
with
∑
j∈R βj > vi(|R|), then, by subadditivity of vi and monotonicity:
vi(|R ∪ Tβ|) ≤ vi(|R|) + vi(|Tβ |) <
∑
j∈R
βj +
∑
j∈Tβ
βj =
∑
j∈R∪Tβ
βj
17
which contradicts the maximality of Tβ .
Next, define D˜ to be a distribution of bidding vectors similar to D, differing from it as
follows. For every vector β in the support of D that occurs with a certain probability, a
vector β˜ exists in the support of D˜, that occurs with the same probability and is made from
β according to the following rules:
1. Identify a subset of indices Tβ for β and let T¯β = [x] \ Tβ .
2. β˜ contains all bids of β except for {βj |j ∈ Tβ}; it contains a zero for each bid therein.
Sampling a vector from D˜ is equivalent to sampling a vector β from D and constructing β˜ as
prescribed (using “˜” over a β will correspond to this processing). For any β ∼ D and for
any arbitrary bid bi, we observe that xi(bi, β˜) ≤ xi(bi, β)+ |Tβ|. Thus, by subadditivity and
monotonicity of vi:
vi
(
xi(bi, β˜)
)
≤ vi
(
xi(bi, β)
)
+ vi( |Tβ | )
Using
∑
j≤x βj −
∑
j∈T¯β
βj =
∑
j∈Tβ
βj ≥ vi( |Tβ | ), we obtain:
vi
(
xi(bi, β)
)
−
∑
j∈T¯β
βj ≥ vi
(
xi(bi, β˜)
)
−
∑
1≤j≤x
βj (8)
Thus: E
β∼D

vi(xi(bi, β)) − ∑
j∈T¯β
βj

 ≥ E
β∼D

vi(xi(bi, β˜))− ∑
1≤j≤x
βj

 (9)
Now consider bi being drawn from the distribution D˜. Notice that, by their construction,
all the bid vectors in the support of D˜ satisfy no-overbidding. As previously, in our analysis
for the Discriminatory Auction, a further modification that we shall omit in the exposition of
our analysis is that: i adds a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 to each of the components of the bidding
vector bi drawn from D˜ (even to the zero-valued ones). We take expectation of the left-hand
side of (9) over bi ∼ D˜:
E
bi∼D˜
γ∼D

vi(xi(bi, γ))− ∑
j∈T¯γ
γj

 = E
β∼D
γ∼D

vi(xi(β˜, γ))− ∑
j∈T¯γ
γj


= E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)]
− E
β∼D

∑
j∈T¯β
βj

 (10)
Accordingly, we take expectation of the right-hand side of (9) over D¯, to obtain:
E
bi∼D¯
γ∼D

vi(xi(bi, γ˜))− ∑
1≤j≤x
γj

 = E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ˜)
)]
− E
β∼D

 ∑
1≤j≤x
βj


≥ E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)]
− E
β∼D

 ∑
1≤j≤x
βj

 (11)
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Notice that the second line of this derivation differs from the right-hand side of the first line
only in that the allocation xi(·, ·) of i is evaluated when he plays β˜ against γ, instead of against
γ˜. Since γ˜ is a “truncation” of γ, the inequality xi(β˜, γ˜) ≥ xi(β˜, γ) is justified. Finally, we
take expectation of (7) over bi ∼ D˜, to obtain:
E
bi∼D˜
b−i∼P
[
uvii (bi,b−i)
]
≥ E
bi∼D˜
b−i∼P
[
vi
(
xi(bi,b−i)
)
−
∑
j≤x
bi(j)
]
= E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)
−
∑
j∈T¯β
βj
]
= E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)]
− E
β∼D

∑
j∈T¯β
βj

 (12)
By (12), (11), (10) and (9) we derive:
E
bi∼D¯
b−i∼P
[
uvii (bi,b−i)
]
≥ E
β∼D
γ∼D
[
vi
(
xi(β˜, γ)
)]
− E
β∼D

 ∑
1≤j≤x
βj

 (13)
The lower bounding by vi(x)/2 of the first term of the right-hand side of this expression is
done as previously, for the Discriminatory Auction, in derivations (5) through (6); as before,
we ensure existence of a pure bidding strategy bi ∼ D¯ that satisfies the requirements of
Theorem 5 and (1), with (λ, µ) =
(
1
2 , 1
)
.
5.4 Lower Bounds
The only lower bound known for the Discriminatory Auction is due to Christodoulou et al. [7];
the authors prove a lower bound of 1.109 for an auction involving two bidders and three items.
However, they argue that their construction does not appear to be further extendable, towards
achievement of a tight lower bound. We prove here an impossibility result, showing that for
the Discriminatory Auction no bound better than ee−1 on the Price of Anarchy can be achieved
via the proof template given in Theorem 5. Similarly, for the Uniform Price Auction we rule
out that a bound better than 2 on the Price of Anarchy can be derived through this template.
Theorem 6. There is a lower bound of ee−1 and 2 on the Bayesian Price of Anarchy for
the Discriminatory Auction and the Uniform Price Auction, respectively, with submodular
valuation functions that can be derived through the proof template given in Theorem 5.
Proof. We first prove the lower bound for the Discriminatory Auction. Fix k ∈ N and
µ ≥ 0 arbitrarily. We construct an instance of the Discriminatory Auction with 2 bidders,
submodular valuation functions v and bidding vectors b, such that for every possible deviation
b′i of bidder i = 1, 2 we have
2∑
i=1
uvii (b
′
i,b−i) ≤ µ
(
1−
1
e1/µ
+
1
k
(
1−
1
e
))
SW (v,xv)− µ
k∑
j=1
βj(b).
By taking k to infinity, we see that for any fixed value of µ, the best Price of Anarchy that we
can obtain using Theorem 5 is max{1, µ}/(µ(1− e−1/µ)). The latter expression is minimized
by taking µ = 1, and from this the claim follows.
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The construction of our instance is as follows: Let the valuation functions be defined as
v1(j) = j and v2(j) = 0 for every j ∈ [k]. Then x
v
1 = k and x
v
2 = 0 and the optimal social
welfare is SW (v,xv) = k. Define the bid vector b1 of bidder 1 to be the zero vector and the
bid vector b2 of bidder 2 as
b2(j) =


1− k
e1/µ(k−j+1)
if 1 ≤ j ≤ k
(
1− 1
e1/µ
)
+ 1,
0 if j > k
(
1− 1
e1/µ
)
+ 1.
We assume that the tie-breaking rule of the auction always assigns a unit to bidder 1 when
there is a tie. Then, if bidder 2 bids b2, there is a j between 1 and k
(
1− 1
e1/µ
)
+1 such that
bidder 1 maximizes his utility when he sets all his bids equal to b2(j). Let b
′
1 = b2(j)1 for
some j in this range. We have
uv11 (b
′
1,b−2) = v1(k − j + 1)− (k − j + 1)b2(j)
=
k
e1/µ
+ µ
k∑
ℓ=1
b2(j) − µ
k∑
ℓ=1
βj(b)
≤
k
e1/µ
+ µ
∫ k(1−e−1/µ)+1
1
(
1−
k
e1/µ
(k − t+ 1)
)
dt+
µ
⌈k(1− 1
e1/µ
)⌉∑
ℓ=1
(b2(ℓ)− b2(ℓ+ 1)) − µ
k∑
ℓ=1
βj(b)
= kµ
(
1−
1
e1/µ
)
+ b2(1) − µ
k∑
ℓ=1
βj(b)
= µ
(
1−
1
e1/µ
+
1
k
(
1−
1
e
))
SW (v,xv)− µ
k∑
ℓ=1
βj(b).
For bidder 2, uv22 (b
′
2,b−1) ≤ 0 for every bid vector b
′
2. This establishes our claim for the
Discriminatory Auction.
Theorem 6 rules out the possibility of obtaining better bounds by means of the smoothness
framework of [31], or by means of any approach aiming at identifying the b′i required by
Theorem 5, including [12]. These are essentially the only known techniques for obtaining
upper bounds on the Bayesian Price of Anarchy. Thus, any improvement on our upper
bound for the Discriminatory Auction must use either specific properties of the (Bayes-Nash
equilibrium) distribution D, or a completely new approach altogether.
6 Smoothness and its Implications
In this section we discuss implications of our developed bounds, on simultaneous and sequen-
tial compositions of auction mechanisms, in the spirit that they have been studied in previous
works [6, 2, 16, 30, 31]. In particular, we elaborate on the connections of our results to the
smoothness framework, recently developed by Syrgkanis and Tardos [31], for bounding the
inefficiency of such composite auction mechanisms. A simultaneous composition of auction
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mechanisms is a mechanism M itself, wherein each of m distinct goods is allocated in a sep-
arate auction, independently of – and simultaneously to all other goods. This setting was
first investigated by Christodoulou, Kovacs and Schapira in [6], where the authors studied
the inefficiency of simultaneous Second-Price Auctions. In the setting of [6], bidders have
combinatorial valuation functions, defined over subsets of goods; however, they must bid sep-
arately (and simultaneously) for each distinct good, in a separate Second-Price auction. In
the same spirit, a sequential composition of auction mechanisms is a mechanism M, wherein
each of m distinct goods is allocated in a separate auction and these auctions are carried out
sequentially. The inefficiency of this setting was first investigated by Paes Leme, Syrgkanis
and Tardos [32] and, subsequently, by Syrgkanis and Tardos [30, 31] in the incomplete infor-
mation setting. In the context of sequential auctions, the inefficiency upper bounds apply for
notions of equilibria under incomplete information, including Perfect Bayesian and Sequential
Equilibria – we refer the reader to [30] for a detailed discussion.
The results we describe here, concern simultaneous and sequential compositions of multi-
unit mechanisms, i.e., Discriminatory and Uniform Price Auctions; the emerging composite
mechanism enables the handling of bidders with multi-unit combinatorial preferences over
multisets of items. In the simultaneous composition setting, every distinct auction is used for
auctioning multiple units of a single good in limited supply. In the sequential composition
setting, all available units of each distinct good are auctioned in a single multi-unit auction;
a sequence of such auctions, one per good, gives rise to the sequential mechanism. Using the
smoothness analysis framework of [31], we show how our improved bounds from the previous
section, for bidders with symmetric submodular and subadditive valuation functions, yield
improved bounds for composite mechanisms, involving bidders with valuation functions over
multisets of items.
6.1 Valuation Functions over Multisets
Before reviewing briefly the smoothness analysis framework, let us describe first the classes
of valuation functions (as given in [31]), to which the analysis of simultaneous/sequential
compositions can be applied. Consider a set [m] of m distinct goods, each good j ∈ [m] being
available in limited supply of kj ≥ 1 identical units. An allocation for each bidder i is a
multiset of items, denoted by xi = (xi(1), . . . , xi(m)), where xi(j) ∈ {0, . . . , kj} is the number
of units from good j ∈ [m]. Let U =
[
×j∈[m]({0} ∪ [kj ])
]
denote the set of all allocation
vectors x corresponding to distinct multisets of items. We consider valuation functions over
multisets, v : U 7→ R+, with v(0) = 0.
Simultaneous Composition. In the simultaneous auctions setting, the smoothness frame-
work of [31] allows usage of our developments from the previous section, if the valuation
functions over multisets satisfy certain conditions (Theorem 5.1 of [31]), in particular if:
The restriction vj of the valuation function v, to each good j ∈ [m], belongs to a class V j and
there exist ρ ≥ 1 sets of valuation functions
{
vj,ℓ ∈ V j
∣∣∣ j ∈ [m]}, for ℓ = 1, . . . , ρ, such that
v(x) = maxℓ
∑
j v
j,ℓ(x(j)).
This condition generalizes the definition of the combinatorial class of fractionally subad-
ditive [11] valuation functions, to the premise of multi-unit availability of each good. The
class of fractionally subadditive valuation functions contains functions v : 2[m] 7→ R+ and
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is identical to the class of XOS functions, identified in [20]. The class XOS is a strict su-
perset of submodular functions over 2[m] and a strict subset of subadditive ones over 2[m]; a
function v belongs to XOS (equivalently, is fractionally subadditive) if there exist ρ additive
functions αℓ : 2[m] 7→ R+, ℓ = 1, . . . , ρ, with αℓ(X) =
∑
j∈X α
ℓ({j}) for any X ∈ 2[m], so that
v(X) = maxℓ α
ℓ(X).
A class of functions that satisfies the aforementioned condition trivially, is the additive
composition v(x) =
∑
j v
j(x(j)) of any set
{
vj
∣∣∣ j ∈ [m]} of symmetric submodular multi-
unit functions vj per good. As in [31], the condition is satisfied by the more general class of
submodular valuation functions over multisets, defined as follows [17, 19]:
Definition 2. For any ℓ = 1, . . . ,m let eℓ be the unary vector with eℓ(ℓ) = 1 and eℓ(j) = 0, for
j 6= ℓ. Let x and y denote two multisets from U , so that x ≤ y, where “≤” holds component-
wise. Then, a non-decreasing function v : U 7→ R+ is submodular if v(x + eℓ) − v(x) ≥
v(y + eℓ)− v(y).
The inefficiency upper bounds that we present for this class of functions improve upon
the ones given in [31]. Moreover, we can also derive upper bounds for valuation functions
that are “fractionally subadditive compositions” of symmetric subadditive functions, in the
following sense:
Definition 3. A valuation function v : U 7→ R+ is a fractionally subadditive composition of
symmetric subadditive functions, if there exist ρ ≥ 1 sets of symmetric subadditive functions{
vj,ℓ : [kj ] 7→ R
+
∣∣∣ j ∈ [m]}, for ℓ = 1, . . . , ρ, so that v(x) = maxℓ∑j vj,ℓ(x(j)).
Let us note here that the class described in Definition 3, is strictly contained in the class
of subadditive valuation functions over multisets, which consists of the functions satisfying
v(x) ≤ v(y) + v(z), for x = y + z. The results described below (Table 2) are valid for the
classes of functions described in Definitions 2 and 3.
Sequential Composition. For sequential compositions, the smoothness framework of [31]
can yield interesting inefficiency bounds for valuation functions v : ×j({0} ∪ [kj ]) 7→ R
+ that
can be expressed as v(x) = maxj v
j(x(j)), for an appropriate selection of a set of m symmetric
multi-unit valuation functions
{
vj
∣∣∣ j ∈ [m]}. Notice that this definition is reminiscent of the
class of Unit-Demand valuation functions, for the combinatorial setting with a single unit per
good (i.e., kj = 1). Indeed, it was shown very recently in [13] that, even for Gross-Substitute
valuation functions (a class that strictly contains Unit-Demand and is strictly contained in
the submodular class [20]), sequential first-price auctions become prohibitively inefficient.
The results that we present for sequential compositions (Table 2) are valid for such “Unit-
Demand Compositions” of symmetric submodular and subadditive valuation functions.
6.2 Smoothness Upper Bounds
We first review the smoothness definitions introduced in [31] (adapted to our multi-unit
auction setting). As introduced earlier, let Pi(b) refer to the payment of bidder i under
bidding profile b.
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Definition 4 ([31]). A mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth for λ > 0 and µ ≥ 0 if for any
valuation profile v and for any bidding profile b there exists a randomized bidding strategy
B′i ≡ B
′
i(v,bi) for each bidder i, such that∑
i∈[n]
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥ λSW (v,xv)− µ
∑
i∈[n]
Pi(b).
In [31] it is shown that if a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth, then several results follow auto-
matically. One such result concerns upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy. Another result
is that the smoothness property is retained under simultaneous and sequential compositions.
We summarize the main composition results of [31] in the theorem below.
Theorem 7 (Theorems 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 5.2 in [31]).
(i) If M is (λ, µ)-smooth, then the correlated (or mixed Bayesian) Price of Anarchy of M
is at most max{1, µ}/λ.
(ii) If M is a simultaneous (respectively, sequential) composition of m (λ, µ)-smooth mech-
anisms, then M is (λ, µ)-smooth (resp., (λ, µ + 1)-smooth).
By exploiting our Key Lemma, we can show that the Discriminatory Auction is smooth.
Theorem 8 in combination with Theorem 7 leads to the composition results stated in Table 2
(these bounds are achieved for α = 1).
Theorem 8. The Discriminatory Auction is (λ, µ)-smooth (both in the standard and uniform
bidding format) with
(i) (λ, µ) = (α
(
1− e−1/α
)
, α) for submodular valuation functions, and
(ii) (λ, µ) = (α2
(
1− e−1/α
)
, α) for subadditive valuation functions.
In particular, we obtain as a corollary, by using Theorem 7, improved upper bounds for
the classes of valuation functions defined in Definitions 2 and 3.
Proof. Note that for the Discriminatory Auction we have
∑
i∈[n]
Pi(b) =
∑
i∈[n]
xi(b)∑
j=1
bi(j) =
k∑
j=1
βj(b).
Note that Lemma 3 holds for every bidder i ∈ [n] with λ and µ as stated in Theorem 8 (see
also the proof of Theorem 3). By invoking Lemma 3 and summing inequality (3) over all
bidders, we obtain
∑
i∈[n]
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥ λ
∑
i∈[n]
vi(x
v
i )− µ
∑
i∈[n]
xvi∑
j=1
βj(b−i) ≥ λSW (v,x
v)− µ
k∑
j=1
βj(b),
where the last inequality holds because for every bidder i, βj(b−i) ≤ βj(b) for every j =
1, . . . , k, and
∑
i∈[n] xi(b) = k and βj(b) is non-decreasing in j.
For auction mechanisms where one needs to impose a no-overbidding assumption, a dif-
ferent smoothness notion is introduced in [31]. Given a mechanism M, define bidder i’s
willingness-to-pay as the maximum payment he could ever pay conditional to being allocated
x units, i.e., Wi(bi, x) = maxb−i:xi(b)=x Pi(b).
23
Valuation Functions∗
Discriminatory Auction Uniform Price Auction
Simultaneous Sequential Simultaneous Sequential
Submodular e
e− 1
2e
e− 1
3.1462
Subadditive 2e
e− 1
4e
e− 1
6.2924
Table 2: Upper bounds on the Bayesian Price of Anarchy for compositions of Discriminatory
and Uniform Price Auctions. ∗The valuation function classes mentioned here correspond (by
abuse of their names) to the ones described in subsection 6.1.
Definition 5 ([31]). A mechanism M is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth for λ > 0 and µ1, µ2 ≥ 0
if for any valuation profile v and for any bidding profile b there exists a randomized bidding
profile B′i ≡ B
′
i(v,bi), for each bidder i, such that∑
i∈[n]
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥ λSW (v,xv)− µ1
∑
i∈[n]
Pi(b)− µ2
∑
i∈[n]
Wi(bi, xi(b)).
Syrgkanis and Tardos [31] establish the following results.
Theorem 9 (Theorems 7.4, C.4 and C.5 in [31]).
(i) If M is (λ, µ1, µ2)-weakly smooth, then the correlated (or mixed Bayesian) Price of
Anarchy of M is at most (µ2 +max{1, µ1})/λ.
(ii) If M is a simultaneous (resp., sequential) composition of m (λ, µ1, µ2)-weakly smooth
mechanisms, then M is (λ, µ1, µ2)-weakly smooth (resp., (λ, µ1+1, µ2)-weakly smooth).
Using our Key Lemma, we can show that the Uniform Price Auction is weakly smooth.
As a consequence, we obtain the composition results stated in Table 2 (these bounds are
achieved for α = −1/(W−1(−1/e
2) + 2) ≈ 0.87).
Theorem 10. The Uniform Price Auction is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth (both in the standard
and uniform bidding format) with
(i) (λ, µ1, µ2) = (α
(
1− e−1/α
)
, 0, α) for submodular valuation functions, and
(ii) (λ, µ1, µ2) = (
α
2
(
1− e−1/α
)
, 0, α) for subadditive valuation functions.
Proof. The following transformation will be helpful in the poof of Theorem 10. Let b be
an arbitrary bidding profile. We derive a uniform bidding profile b¯ from b as follows: Let
ci = bi(xi(b)) be the last winning bid of bidder i ∈ [n]; for ease of notation, we adopt the
convention that bi(0) = 0. Define b¯i as the vector that is ci on the first xi(b) entries and zero
everywhere else. Clearly, b¯ is a uniform bidding profile.
Lemma 6. Let b¯ be the uniform bidding profile derived from b. Then for the Uniform Price
Auction, the following holds for every bidder i ∈ [n]:
(i) xi(b¯) = xi(b);
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(ii) Wi(b¯i, xi(b¯)) = Wi(bi, xi(b)).
We first prove weak smoothness for the uniform bidding format and then extend this
result to the standard bidding format via a coupling argument.
It is not hard to verify that for the Uniform Price Auction we have Wi(bi, x) = xbi(x).
As before, exploiting Lemma 3 and summing inequality (3) over all bidders we obtain
∑
i∈[n]
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥ λSW (v,xv)− µ
k∑
j=1
βj(b).
If b is a uniform bidding profile then the claim follows because
k∑
j=1
βj(b) =
∑
i∈[n]
xi(b)bi(xi(b)) =
∑
i∈[n]
Wi(bi, xi(b)). (14)
Note that for the standard bidding format, the first equality would be false because we can
only infer that
∑
j βj(b) ≥
∑
i xi(b)bi(xi(b)). However, the following work-around establishes
weak smoothness for the Uniform Price Auction and the standard bidding format.
Note that in general Pi(b¯) 6= Pi(b) because all losing bids in b¯ are zero. However,
the above two properties turn out to be sufficient to prove weak smoothness in the standard
bidding format: Let b¯ be the uniform bidding profile that we obtain from b as described above.
Applying Lemma 3 to the uniform bidding profile b¯ and pricing rule Pi(b¯) = Wi(b¯, xi(b¯))
(which is discriminatory price dominated), we conclude that for every bidder i ∈ [n] there
exists a random uniform bidding strategy B′i, b
′
i such that
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
vi(xi(b
′
i, b¯−i))−Wi(b
′
i, xi(b
′
i, b¯−i))
]
≥ λvi(x
v
i )− µ
xvi∑
j=1
βj(b¯−i). (15)
Note that by Lemma 6
uvii (b
′
i,b−i) = vi(xi(b
′
i,b−i))− Pi(b
′
i,b−i) (16)
≥ vi(xi(b
′
i,b−i))−Wi(b
′
i, xi(b
′
i,b−i))
= vi(xi(b
′
i, b¯−i))−Wi(b
′
i, xi(b
′
i, b¯−i)). (17)
By summing inequality (15) over all bidders and exploiting (17), we thus obtain
∑
i∈[n]
Eb′i∼B
′
i
[
uvii (b
′
i,b−i)
]
≥ λSW (v,xv)− µ
k∑
j=1
βj(b¯) = λSW (v,x
v)− µ
∑
i∈[n]
Wi(b¯i, xi(b¯))
= λSW (v,xv)− µ
∑
i∈[n]
Wi(bi, xi(b))
where the first equality follows from (14) because b¯ is a uniform bidding profile and the second
equality holds because of Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let β1 and β0 refer to the smallest winning bid and largest losing bid
under bidding profile b, respectively. Note that every winning bid under b¯ is at least β1 and
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can only increase under b. Also, every losing bid under b¯ is at most β0 under b. We conclude
that a bid is winning under b¯ if and only if it is winning under b, which proves (i).
Recall that Wi(b¯i, xi(b¯)) = xi(b¯)b¯i(xi(b¯)). Now, using (i) and the definition of b¯i, we
obtain: Wi(b¯i, xi(b¯)) = xi(b¯)b¯i(xi(b¯)) = xi(b)b¯i(xi(b)) = xi(b)bi(xi(b)) = Wi(bi, xi(b)),
which shows (ii). ✷
7 Conclusions
We derived inefficiency upper bounds in the incomplete information model for the widely
popular Discriminatory and Uniform Price Auctions, when bidders have submodular or sub-
additive valuation functions. Notably, our bounds for subadditive valuation functions already
improve upon the ones that were known for submodular bidders [21, 31]. Moreover, for
each of the two formats and valuation function classes we considered both the standard bid-
ding interface [18, 23] and a practically motivated uniform bidding interface. To derive our
results, we elaborated on several techniques from the recent literature on Simultaneous Auc-
tions [31, 12, 6, 2]. By the recent developments of [31], our bounds for submodular bidders
yield improved inefficiency bounds for simultaneous and sequential compositions of the consid-
ered formats. In absence of an indicative lower bound in the incomplete information model,
we showed that our upper bound of ee−1 for the Discriminatory Auction with submodular
valuation functions is best possible, w.r.t. the currently known proof techniques. Further
reducing our upper bound for the Uniform Price Auction (with submodular bidders), poses
a particularly challenging problem, given the lower bound of 2. For the case of subadditive
bidders, the open problems involve reducing further the upper bounds (for both auctions)
under the uniform bidding format, when bidders have subadditive valuation functions. For
the Uniform Price Auction in particular, improvements should be attainable also under the
standard bidding interface.
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